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Key Points
•

The energy transition will be mineral intensive:
production of certain critical minerals is estimated to
increase by more than 450% by 2050. The mining and
metals sector already contributes 5–7% of greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions globally and, as production
increases, so too will emissions linked to the sector.

•

Although fragile states in Africa contribute minimally
to GHG emissions, they have a high degree of
vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
Governments can and should mobilize the mining
sector to play a meaningful role in meeting their
climate mitigation and adaptation needs and those of
project–affected communities. The increased demand
for critical minerals to produce renewable energy
and battery solutions tends to increase investment
flows into the mining sector of several of those states,
making it all the more crucial for their governments
to ensure that new mining investments support
sustainable development objectives. Requiring mining
companies to contribute to sustainable development
objectives, including climate objectives, can
increase a country’s competitiveness in international
markets, leverage the sector’s contribution to GHG
emissions reductions, and minimize its impact
on the country’s environment and communities.

•

Recognizing that laws are the ideal legal instrument
to regulate the mining sector’s contribution to climate
mitigation and adaptation, governments may still
consider updating model mining development
agreements (MMDAs), or negotiating climate-related
contractual provisions, as a stop-gap measure in the
absence of relevant laws. In this paper, we explore
whether governments are using, and how they can
use, investor–state contracts to advance climate goals
in the context of the mining sector.

•

Based on our review of publicly available mining
contracts signed by five fragile states in Africa
(Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea,
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone) post–Paris Agreement,
we conclude that in large part the contracts reviewed
do not include climate-related provisions. Robust
climate provisions may be absent because these
issues are regulated by laws rather than contracts.

•

Though an exhaustive review of climate-related laws
was outside the scope of this research, we found that
some fragile states in Africa include climate-related

provisions in law to varying degrees. For example,
Guinea’s 2019 Environmental Code encourages all
companies, including in the mining sector, to use
renewable energy and mandates the environment
minister to implement the National Strategy for
Climate Change Adaptation.
•

We synthesize our findings and recommendations for
six categories of contractual provisions, considering
the most critical climate-related impacts and
contributions of mining projects. Though the analysis
focuses on contracts concluded by five fragile states
in Africa, our policy recommendations are general
in nature and apply to all host governments that
do not already have robust laws in place to ensure
that the mining sector contributes to climate
change mitigation and adaptation objectives.
Our recommendations for governments updating
their model mining development agreement or
negotiating contractual provision are as follows:
o

Integrate renewable energy into mining
projects. Governments can support increased
renewable power integration by requiring mining
companies to use renewable energy sources. No
evidence of this practice was found in the contracts
reviewed.

o

Reduce deforestation. To restrict forest
conversion, governments could require mining
companies to account for direct, indirect, and
induced impacts on forests at every stage of the
operations, as well as systematically applying the
mitigation hierarchy throughout the life-cycle of the
mine. The absence of provisions on deforestation
in the contracts analyzed may be because this
aspect is regulated by laws rather than contracts.

o

Require a climate risk assessment and
community vulnerability assessment. Mining
contracts should expressly require mines to
comply with national adaptation plans (NAPs)
and climate adaptation guidelines where such
instruments have been developed by the host
country. Community development requirements
contained in community development agreements
(CDAs) should require mining companies to
incorporate climate change adaptation strategies
when requested by affected communities. None
of the contracts reviewed includes provisions on
climate change adaptation strategies.
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o

o

Regulate water use. Governments should
expressly condition the grant of water rights
to mining companies on stringent obligations
regarding water use efficiency, include penalties
for water overuse or release of non-treated waste
water, and provide for a grievance mechanism for
downstream communities whose water rights are
impacted. The contract should include obligations
for the mine to create shared-use opportunities
to increase the access to water for communities
and reserve the government’s ability to alter
water allocation to mining operations based on
fluctuations in the amount of available water and
the number of users reliant on the water source.
The absence of provisions on water use in the
contracts reviewed may be because this aspect is
regulated by laws rather than contracts.
Require tailings dam design justifications. The
risk of tailings dam failure, exacerbated by climate
change, can be significantly reduced by requiring
companies to justify their tailings dam design.
None of the contracts reviewed includes detailed
provisions on tailings dams. The contract should
ban dams upstream of communities and require
that the mining plan demonstrate that the tailings
dam follows the latest global safety standards
and that ongoing maintenance and remediation
activities will be conducted. Companies should
model the risk of tailings dam failure due to
climate-related risks in the environmental
and social impact assessment (ESIA); and, the
environmental management plan (EMP) should
include the obligation to demonstrate that the
tailings dam is adequately monitored for failure
risk, with the goal of achieving zero failures. Tailings
storage should use the best available technology.
Relevant provisions only appear in eight of
the contracts and are very limited in scope.
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o

Integrate climate risks into closure plans.
While more than half of the contracts analyzed
require mining companies to plan in advance for
the closure of the mine and the environmental
rehabilitation of the mine site, none requires
them to integrate climate risks into closure plans.
Contracts should:
o

Mandate that closure plans be submitted at the
beginning of the project along with the ESIA.

o

Describe how the company intends to avoid
or mitigate the environmental impacts
associated with halting its operations.

o

Include rehabilitation strategies that reflect an
understanding of the changing relationship
between the ecosystem and the climate.

o

Require companies to model the long-term
sustainability of rehabilitation projects.

July 2021

1

Introduction

At the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference, the world’s
governments set an ambitious goal of limiting global
temperature rise to 1.5 °C over pre-industrial levels. To
meet this goal, global anthropogenic CO2 emissions
must decline steadily and reach net zero by about
2050.2 The pathway to a low-carbon future requires a
fundamental shift away from fossil fuels and toward
clean energy technologies.
This transition will be mineral-intensive: the World Bank
estimates that the production of minerals could increase
by more than 450% by 2050 to meet the growing demand
for clean energy technologies.3 How these minerals are
produced will have a lasting effect on the clean energy
transition. The mining and metal sector contributes
4–7% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally.4
Without adequate regulation to incentivize climatefriendly sustainable operations, increases in mineral
extraction risk increasing the sector’s carbon footprint.5
In addition, climate change acts as a risk multiplier by
increasing the risk of flooding, drought, and landslides
and, as such, exacerbates the negative externalities
caused by poor mining practices.
First and foremost, climate change considerations should
be incorporated into the climate, environmental, water,
forestry, energy, or mining laws of mineral-rich countries.
For example, in 2016, Kenya passed a climate law that
requires climate mainstreaming in all sectors.6 Guinea’s
2019 Environmental Code encourages the use of renewable
energy wherever possible and mandates the environment
minister to implement the National Strategy for Climate
Change Adaptation.7 But the pace of legislative processes
is often slow—and in countries where the legislation does
not include climate change mitigation and adaptation
requirements,8 countries may turn to contractual provi
sions to compel the mining sector to shift to climatesensitive practices. This paper assesses the extent to
which this is being done through an analysis of all publicly
available mining contracts signed by fragile states in Africa9
after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015
that appear on ResourceContracts.org (21 contracts).10
Though the magnitude of African fragile states’ contri
bution to global GHG emissions is minimal, these states
have a comparatively high degree of vulnerability to the
impacts of climate change.11 In this context, governments

can and should mobilize the mining sector to play a
meaningful role in meeting their climate mitigation
and adaptation needs and those of project-affected
communities. In addition, the increased demand for
critical minerals to produce renewable energy and
battery solutions tends to increase investment flows
into the mining sector of several of those fragile states,12
making it all the more crucial for their governments
to ensure that new mining investments support each
country’s sustainable development goals. Doing so,
with respect to climate action, furthers both a country’s
competitiveness in international markets13 and minimize
the mining sector’s footprint on the country’s environment
and communities.
Though our analysis focuses on contracts concluded
by fragile states in Africa, the policy recommendations
that we draw from their analysis apply to all host
governments that do not already have robust laws that
operationalize mitigation and adaptation goals and are
eager to leverage and strengthen the role of their mining
sectors in achieving sustainable development.
Our recommendations envision generating long-term
savings over the life of the mines, even if some of those
recommendations may in practice represent higher
upfront costs for mining companies. For example,
adopting renewable energy sources, though possibly
more expensive at the outset, is more cost-effective
than fossil fuels considering the life of a mine.14 Avoiding
deforestation early on also generates savings for mining
companies when the time comes to fulfill their mine
closure and rehabilitation obligations. Furthermore, by
supporting community efforts to build resilience to climate
change, mining companies have the opportunity to
meaningfully contribute to project-affected communities.
Attention to climate change considerations that entail
higher expenditures by mining investors at the initial
stages of the operation of a mine also tend to reduce the
tax revenues from mining for host governments in the
short term. However, for governments, too, the long-term
benefits outweigh the initial revenue reductions. As long
as governments put strong progressive fiscal regimes in
place,15 they will be able to reap the upside from a climateaware, low-carbon mining sector that will be more
profitable than a business-as-usual, carbon-intensive
mining sector in the medium to long term.
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2

Climate-Related Provisions in
Investor–State Contracts

Even as awareness of the mining sector’s positive and
negative contributions to climate change has increased,
countries have not included robust climate provisions
in the mining contracts analyzed. The absence of robust
climate provisions may be because the sector’s role in
climate change mitigation and adaptation is regulated
by laws rather than contracts. Where it is not, mineralrich governments may seek to include climate-related
provisions in investor
–state contracts, including those
concluded based on model mining development
agreements (MMDAs). For example, investor–state
mining contracts can include specific provisions to
promote sustainable, climate-friendly mining practices,
regulating the most critical climate-related impacts and
contributions of mining projects. The following sections
highlight six categories of provisions that may be included.
These categories fall under climate change mitigation
(requirements to minimize the use of fossil fuels,
integrate the use of low-carbon energy sources, minimize
deforestation, and restore forest cover) and adaptation
(requirements to conduct climate risk and community
vulnerability assessments, reduce water use, and
design climate-resilient tailings dams and closure plans).
In addition, international standards can be incorporated
into investor–state contracts to regulate certain aspects
of investor behavior. For instance, ten of the reviewed
contracts incorporate the International Finance
Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards.16 While
robust climate-related international standards do not
yet exist to regulate mining projects, we expect existing
standards to be updated or new ones developed
given the global decarbonization agenda.
2.1

Climate Change Mitigation

2.1.1

Energy Sources

Mining operations account for 2–11% of global energy
consumption.17 The sector’s energy consumption is largely
fossil fuel-based; renewables have constituted less than
10% of total energy consumption since 1971.18 As demand
for minerals increases and ore grades decline, the mining
sector’s energy needs are projected to increase by more
than a third by 2035.19
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Governments have an opportunity to require that mining
companies fulfill their increased energy needs through
renewable sources, but our review found no evidence
of this practice in any of the contracts reviewed. Six of
the contracts reviewed include provisions that explicitly
permit mining companies to build energy-related
infrastructure, but none of these provisions required such
infrastructure to produce clean energy.20 Moreover, four
of the contracts provide custom duty exemptions on
fossil fuels.21 Financial incentives, including fossil fuel
subsidies, often lock in the sector’s reliance on fossil
fuels. Compared to diesel, renewables have relatively
high upfront capital costs but are competitive on a nonsubsidized basis. Although diesel plants have much higher
operating costs, generous subsidies make fossil fuels an
artificially attractive energy source; in addition, mining
companies are often exempt from taxes on fuels used for
off-road operations and energy generation.22 Requiring
use of renewable energy sources through contracts is
one way to recalibrate incentives and support increased
renewable power integration. To do this, governments
may consider the following:
•

Require companies to demonstrate in the
mining plan that their designs are energy
efficient and integrate renewable energy to the
extent practicable.

•

Require environmental impact assessments to
include the modeling of GHG emissions, including
from deforestation over the life of the mine (see
the deforestation section below).

•

Require companies to develop both a businessas-usual model, showing the trajectory that
GHG emissions would follow in absence of any
measures to reduce them, and a model showing
how much emissions need to be reduced for the
mine to achieve carbon neutrality in line with a
1.5 °C trajectory.

•

Require environmental management plans to
include all necessary measures over the life of the
mine to achieve carbon neutrality in line with a 1.5
°C trajectory. These measures may include the use
of renewables-based electricity or green hydrogen
in lieu of fossil fuels in mining operations, energy
efficiency improvements, deployment of energy
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storage solutions, and even carbon capture and
storage in case of heavy downstream processes.23
•

Require companies to measure and disclose GHG
emissions in accordance with accepted standards
(e.g. the GHG Protocol24).

•

Require mines to electrify surrounding
communities using renewable power. This
approach can be taken at a low marginal cost to
the company while also fulfilling the important
development objective of extending electricity to
energy-poor communities.

•

Do not include clauses that provide fossil fuel
subsidies (e.g. through customs duty exemptions)
in future contracts.

2.1.2

Deforestation

is notable, however, that some contracts appear to
allow unlimited forest conversion.34 Others require prior
authorization before cutting or logging protected forests.35
Two contracts require reforestation or revegetation
of land at the end of operations, where suitable.36
Restricting forest conversion through contract terms is
particularly necessary in the absence of robust legislation
that regulates the use of forested land.37 To do this,
governments may consider requiring mining companies
to account for direct, indirect, and induced impacts on
forests at every stage of the operations, including in the
mining plan, the environmental impact assessment
(EIA), and the environmental management plan (EMP),
as well as systematically applying the mitigation
hierarchy through the life of the mine.38
•

About half of active mines operate in forest landscapes.25
Of these, more than half are located in low-income or
lower middle–income countries.26 Mining operations can
result in significant deforestation as companies clear
forests to build mines and surrounding infrastructure.
Mining accounts for about 7% of total forest loss across
Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and is associated with a
decline in the quality and quantity of ecosystem services.27
Mining-driven deforestation is likely to increase: in recent
years, twenty or more new mines in forest landscapes
have been commissioned annually, compared to four to
ten during the 1980s.28
Ongoing deforestation has significant implications for
climate change. Forests store vast amounts of carbon;
when they are cleared or burned, their stored carbon is
released into the atmosphere. Forestry and other land
use activities have historically accounted for about a third
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions,29 and between 2007–
2016 close to 23% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions
derive from these activities.30 Reductions to forest cover
directly affect local surface temperatures and can affect
temperature and rainfall in regions hundreds of kilometers
away.31 Additionally, deforestation can accelerate soil
erosion by up to 1,000 times, leading to an increased risk
of landslides and flooding in certain regions.32
A third of contracts reviewed are silent on deforestation.33
This is not surprising as deforestation is typically handled
in legislation, including in our sample of countries. It

•

•

•

The mining plan, for example, should require
companies to collect data to establish a baseline39
and provide the government with an accurate,
third-party verified survey of forested land within
the concession area.
Under the EMP, companies could be required to
formally report their forest conversion activities
and conduct internal audits to demonstrate that
they are achieving no net loss or net gain.40
In cases where the contract area includes areas
that should remain permanently forested (due
to zoning errors, for example), the contract
should also specify that these areas must remain
permanently forested and provide clear penalties
for violations.
Additionally, a requirement of complete or partial
reforestation should be included as part of the
closure plan.41

2.2

Climate Change Adaptation

2.2.1

Climate Risk Assessment and Community
Vulnerability Assessment

Climate change adaptation in a mining context refers
to how mining companies can incorporate climate
considerations into mining processes, practices, and
structures to mitigate climate-related risks.42 It relates to
the company’s “ability to adapt to changes, anticipate
what might happen next, and absorb weather and
climate-related shocks when they happen.”43 Importantly,
climate change adaptation also refers to the role of mining
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companies in strengthening the resilience of miningaffected communities to climate-related impacts.
Climate change poses risks to the mining sector and
mining-affected communities with the increased
frequency and intensity of severe weather events that
affect mining operations both directly—in terms of mine
closures, damage to infrastructure, access to water, and
more dangerous working conditions—and indirectly,
when their supply chains are similarly impacted. At the
same time, integrating climate adaptation strategies
into the lifecycle of a mining project can improve mine
performance and efficiency, thereby reducing costs and
even increasing revenues, including for the government
through tax revenues.
Climate change can exacerbate vulnerabilities in
host communities where droughts, floods, increasing
temperatures, and natural disasters lead to a loss of
livelihood, food shortages, crop failures, the spread
of diseases, and worsening social conditions.44 The
presence of a mine can also negatively impact community
resilience. Engaging with mining-affected communities
to build their resilience to the impacts of climate change
is fundamentally important for mining companies
to maintain their social license and meet public
expectations regarding corporate responsibility.
A climate adaptation strategy will ensure that miningrelated assets are better able to withstand more frequent
and severe climate events (see, for example, the Tailings
Dams section below). It will also help to mitigate the
project’s impact on the surrounding environment and
community, including water supply (see the Water
section below), during the life of the mine and/or postclosure (see the Closure Plans section below). A climate
adaptation strategy is most effective where mining
companies integrate climate change considerations
into their own corporate strategies and then make
investment, construction, and operational decisions
based on best practices of global climate change
models tailored to local, site-specific conditions.45
None of the contracts reviewed includes provisions that
relate to climate adaptation strategies.
Mining contracts should expressly require mines to
comply with the national adaptation plans (NAPs) and
climate adaptation guidelines when such instruments
have been developed by the host country.46
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Moreover, in the context of the EIA and EMP, mining
companies should be required to assess climate risks
and impacts and develop management plans to address
them. In the same way that contracts often prescribe the
contents of an EIA and EMP, they could similarly define
what a climate risk assessment and related management
plan entail. The climate risk assessment exercise entails
defining critical thresholds and then assessing when and
where critical thresholds could be exceeded triggering
intolerable risks. Such thresholds could be “the available
freeboard of a tailings dam, a maximum safe working
temperature for personnel”47 or the maximum length of
a drought period for local communities. The threshold
should be anticipated as being exceeded with growing
probability and intensity as time passes. The data on
probability, frequency, and magnitude of extreme weather
events should rely on changes to the weather across short
(12 hours), medium (5 days), and longer (annual trends)
terms.48 Moreover, the climate risk assessment should
also cover incremental changes in climate conditions
as these can affect the mining design and impact the
surrounding environment on a cumulative basis. Lastly,
the assessment should be conducted as if no adaptation
measures were in place to apprehend maximum risk.49
The identified risks and site-specific mitigation strategies
in the EIAs should also inform EMPs used to assess and
monitor mining operations. In the mining development
plan, mining companies should demonstrate the
integration of the result of the climate risk assessment into
the decisions on where to locate mining assets and in the
design of mining-related infrastructure. Risk mitigation
strategies should be constantly revised to reflect the
latest predictions.50 Emergency preparedness plans
should also be put in place, reviewed, and updated to
reflect best practices with respect to climate-related risks.
Mining companies are also well placed to assist by
engaging early on with communities to improve their
resilience to climate-related risks. This could include
helping to develop emergency planning practices and
supporting communities to develop and implement
climate change adaptation plans.51 In this regard,
community development requirements contained in
law or in community development agreements (CDAs)
could require companies to contribute to community
climate change adaptation strategies if communities
deem it appropriate. For example, mining companies
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could provide financial support and training to local
communities for the communities to run a vulnerability
assessment on their livelihood resources, develop
adaptation measures, and to identify where the company
could support communities’ resilience.52 These areas can
be related to infrastructure, agriculture, water, health, and
biodiversity, as well as emergency preparedness.

a grievance mechanism for downstream communities
whose water rights are impacted.

2.2.2

The contract should also reserve the government’s
ability to alter water allocation to mining operations
based on fluctuations in the amount of available water
and the number of users reliant on the water source.
Adjustments of this nature are statutorily authorized in
South Africa, and other states could draw on these water
use laws in drafting contract terms.59 Relatedly, the EIA
should contain requirements to periodically assess the
climate impacts on the mining region’s aquifer and adjust
the mine’s water use rights accordingly.

Water Use

Access to a stable water supply is crucial to mining
operations. Water is required to suppress dust, process ore,
cool and wash mining equipment, and manage tailings;
without water, a mine cannot operate. Hard rock mining,
in particular, involves a significant amount of water to
separate and purify minerals. As mining operations expand
to meet the mineral needs of the clean energy transition,
the water footprint of the mining sector will increase.
The six largest mining companies operate 70% of their
mining projects in water-stressed regions.53 Water is
already a source of conflict between mining companies
and local communities, particularly when mines operate
upstream of communities that rely on the same water
source.54 More frequent droughts due to climate change
could lead to severe water shortages and more frequent
flooding during the rainy season. This could inundate
mines, cause more closures, leach harmful chemicals into
the environment, and destabilize infrastructure such that
mines may collapse.
Yet, out of the contracts reviewed that include waterrelated provisions, most do not limit the amount of
water mining companies may use or require that mining
companies treat the water they use before discharging
it.55 Like with deforestation, this is not surprising because
water rights are usually established by legislation,
including in our sample.
In the absence of robust laws that regulate water use,
governments should expressly condition the grant of
water rights to mining companies on stringent obligations
regarding water use efficiency.56 For example, in drafting
the mining plan, companies should be required to
demonstrate that they are using the most water-efficient
designs, including planning for zero water waste and
prioritizing water reuse over the request for water rights.57
Additionally, the contract should include a penalty for
water overuse or release of non-treated waste water and

The contract should include obligations for the mine to
create shared-use opportunities when developing a water
solution for the mine to increase nearby communities’
access to water.58

2.2.3

Tailings Dams

Tailings are a common byproduct of mineral extraction
and are typically stored as a slurry in dammed reservoirs.
The properties of tailings vary according to the size and
structure of the mined rock and the chemicals used in
mineral processing. Tailings may range from highly toxic
to relatively harmless, though most are acidic and contain
high salt concentrations. As the mining sector expands
and ore grades fall, tailings waste is set to increase.60
The stability of tailings storage facilities largely depends
on consistent land and weather conditions. Global
warming–related changes in precipitation patterns
and ambient temperature will affect soil moisture and
ground temperature, weakening tailings structures.
Under hot and arid conditions, for example, water
evaporation will concentrate tailings, accelerate acid
mine drainage, and lead to widespread environmental
contamination. In wetter climates, heavy rainfall may
cause tailings dams to overflow or collapse.
When tailings dams fail, they may release millions of
liters of toxic waste into the environment, resulting in
water pollution, widespread destruction, and loss of
life. Although the total number of tailings dam failures is
declining, the risk of catastrophic tailings dam failures has
been increasing since 1990.61 After 2000, the catastrophic
failure rate has been about five or six serious failures
every year.62 Approximately 25% of worldwide tailings
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dam failures are the result of extreme weather events.
This may increase as the effects of climate change
become more acute.63
The risk of tailings dam failure can be greatly reduced
by requiring mining companies to justify their tailings
dam design. However, none of the contracts reviewed
included detailed provisions on tailings dams. Provisions
appearing in eight of the contracts reviewed are limited
to an obligation on the mining company to “secure and
reinforce all water dams, tailings or excavation ponds to
prevent collapse,”64 or to ensure “all dams, whether for
water, debris or waste, [are] safe to resist collapse.”65
Upstream dams (in particular when they are immediately
upstream of communities) should be explicitly banned
by the contract and tailings storage should use the best
available technology, including filtered tailings or dry
stack.66 The contract should require that the mining plan
demonstrate that the tailings dam follows the latest
global safety standards, such as the Safety First Guidelines
for Responsible Mine Tailings Management,67 and that
ongoing maintenance and remediation activities will be
conducted. Furthermore, in the EIA, companies should
model the risk of tailings dam failure due to climaterelated risks like flooding and heavy rainfall, making
sure to assess all possible scenarios of mode of failure,
their probabilities, the severity of the impact on local
communities, and the corresponding costs. The EMP
should include the obligation to demonstrate that the
tailings dam is adequately monitored for failure risk,
with the goal of achieving zero tailings dam failures.
Further, the EMP should provide for both internal and
external inspection systems, with the external inspection
system involving technologies like satellite-based remote
sensing, public disclosure of the inspection results,
and a participatory monitoring role for local communities.
2.2.4

Closure Plans

Mining is a long-term but temporary use of land. As mining
operations wind down, the site is rehabilitated according
to the mine closure plan. Some governments require this
plan to be submitted before mining begins, as it often
influences how companies choose to construct the mine.
Over the decades-long life of a mine and the decades postclosure, environmental conditions may change drastically.
To ensure that the rehabilitated mine site remains stable
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over time, mine closure criteria should be designed
through a climate change risk management lens, where
the magnitude of the risk depends on the likelihood
of a particular climate event and the consequences of
that event.68 For instance, insufficient water and high
temperatures make it harder to re-establish the previous
vegetation in rehabilitation efforts and there may be a need
for drought-resistant vegetation, which could increase
closure cost; ‘bio-mining’ and the growth of fibrous
plants on old tailings dams to extract minerals could also
help address the risk of tailings dam failure post-closure.
Early assessment of likely and unlikely climate risks
enables companies to devise resilient, robust closure
plans. This framework allows companies to assess
whether a risk that is unlikely to occur in the short term
is, in fact, highly likely to occur in the long term and
evaluate how to best prevent it. Importantly, the closure
plan is meant to be iterative; each successive version
represents a more efficient solution.
More than half of the contracts analyzed—notably
those concluded by Guinea and Mozambique—include
provisions that require the mining company to plan in
advance for the closure of the mine69 and the environmental
rehabilitation of the mine site.70 For example, two contracts
from Mozambique71 require mining companies to comply
with closure and rehabilitation obligations in mining
and environmental laws and regulations, and in the
project’s EMPs, and to develop and periodically update a
mine closure plan:
Obligations in the rehabilitation and closure
phase. The Mining Concessionaire must, in relation
to its Mining Concession in the Contract Area,
comply with all the rehabilitation and closure
obligations described in the Mining Law, in the
Environmental Regulation for the Mining Activity,
and in the Environmental Management Plan and
Environmental Management Program approved
pursuant to that regulation and this Contract.72
The Mine Concessionaire must develop and
update periodically, every five years, as part of
the Environmental Management Program, and
in consultation with the beneficiary community
and the local authority, a Mine Closure Program,
which prepares the beneficiary community for the
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eventual closure of the Mining Operations. Such
a program must be articulated with the Local
Development Agreement […].73
However, none of the contracts requires the
concessionaire to integrate climate risks into the
development of the closure plans.
Contracts should require closure plans to be submitted
at the beginning of the project at the time of the EIA
submission74 and describe how the mining company
intends to avoid or mitigate the environmental impacts
associated with closure, as well as how it plans to
rehabilitate the mine site. Rehabilitation strategies should
reflect an understanding of the changing relationship
between the ecosystem and the climate. The contract
should include a requirement to model the long-term
sustainability of rehabilitation projects and set climateresponsive targets.

3

Conclusion

The investor–state contracts reviewed, concluded by five
fragile states in Africa (Chad, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone), largely do
not regulate the mining sector’s contribution to climate
change mitigation or the climate-related impacts of the
sector. In some cases, this may be because there are
relevant laws that apply. In other cases, where robust laws
do not exist, contracts with permissive provisions stand to
worsen the climate-related impacts of the project on the
environment and communities. It is timely for governments
to review and update mining legal frameworks—
including domestic laws, investor–state contracts,
CDAs, and MMDAs—to both increase climate resilience
and align the contributions of the mining sector with
sustainable development objectives.

Additionally, the closure plan should include a section on
the expected cost of mine closure that takes into account
climate-related risks and provides a clear mechanism to
ensure that the company meets the financial obligations
associated with closure. Finally, the closure plan should
require the company to actively monitor the mine site for
a period of time post-closure and the company should
remain liable for related negative environmental impacts
that occur within several years of closure.
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Bauxite Kimbo Limited, Concession Agreement, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-3622819596/view#/
pdf; Santou, Guinea Evergreen Mining Intelligence SA, TBEA Co Ltd, Concession Agreement, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-0842187625/view#/pdf; Boke-Telimele, Société de Développement des Mines Internationales du Henan
SA, Compagnie de Développement des Mines Internationales Henan Chine Guinée, Convention de base amendée et consolidée,
2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-9306677863/view#/pdf; Bel Air Mining, Alufer Mining, Alufer Mining
Limited, Concession, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-8002546923/view#/pdf; Trik, Société des Mines de
Mandiana, Avocet Mining, Managem, Concession, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1880406409/view#/
pdf; SAG, Societe Aurifere de Guinee, Golden Shamrock, Anglogold Ashanti, Amendment, 2016, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-2707180369/view#/pdf; Twigg Exploration and Mining, Concession, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-3253769280/view#/pdf; Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
70 All of the contracts mentioned in the footnote above, as well as SL Mining Limited, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.
org/contract/ocds-591adf-9176507089/view#/pdf; and SierraMin Bauxite Limited, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/
contract/ocds-591adf-4376389326/view#/pdf.
71 Twigg Exploration and Mining, Concession, 2018, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-3253769280/view#/pdf;
Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
72 Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, Art. 9.1, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
73 Capitol Resources, Concession, 2017, Art. 9.4.3, https://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1233175911/view#/pdf.
74 Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development [IGF], Clémence Naré, Suzy H. Nikièma, Marina
Ruete, Kristi Disney Bruckner, Jenifer Hill, Jill Baker, Carolina Leseigneur Torres, and Luke Danielson, IGF Guidance for Governments:
Improving Legal Frameworks for Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Management (Winnipeg: IISD, June 2020), 31,
https://www.iisd.org/publications/igf-guidance-governments-esia.
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